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I examine the relationship between trading blocs and Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). 
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JEL classifications: F15, F23 
Keywords: trading blocs, multinational corporations, FDI, coalition formation game 
                                            
∗ I would like to thank my dissertation advisors, John McLaren and Simon Anderson, for 
their continuous comments on this project. I also thank the Bankard Fund for Political 
Economy for their financial support. Any errors are my own. 
# POSRI, 147 Samsung-dong, Gangnam-gu, Seoul 135-090, Korea (hi6w@posri.re.kr).  1 Introduction
There has been a dramatic increase in regional trading blocs over the last
decade. In many cases, these trading blocs seem to have succeeded in at-
tracting Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). According to a World Trade Or-
ganization study, total in￿ ows of FDI into the member countries of the Eu-
ropean Community (EC) increased considerably from European Currency
Unit (ECU) 10 billion in 1984 to ECU 63 billion in 1989, following the
announcement of the Single Market Program in 1985.1 The Southern Cone
Common Market in Latin America, better known as MERCOSUR, observed
an increase in FDI in￿ ows from $10 billion in 1995 to $17 billion in 1997.2
However, traditionally when trade economists discuss trading blocs, they
have looked mainly at the trading of goods and have not paid appropriate
attention to the importance of FDI, largely out of habit.3
This paper brings FDI into the discussion and analyzes the relationship
between FDI and trading blocs. I show that two countries that form a bloc
may attract FDI from a non-member country. This is because larger and
more integrated markets allow ￿rms outside the bloc to recoup sunk costs
in setting up plants inside the bloc4. Further, the ￿rms can avoid tari⁄s and
transport costs by becoming Multinational Corporations (MNCs), which are
the primary source of FDI. However, it is shown that this FDI-attracting
bloc cannot be an equilibrium outcome when multilateral free trade is an
option. The intuitive explanation is that as ￿rms outside the bloc become
MNCs in response to integration, there will be no possible way for member
countries to extract tari⁄ rents from non-member countries.
Ever since the early formation of the EU, there have been a large num-
ber of studies on economic integration.5 Surprisingly, there has been little
work on the connection between economic integration and FDI with a couple
exceptions. Motta and Norman (1996) argue in an oligopoly model that a
decrease in the intra-regional tari⁄s of a bloc may induce ￿rms outside the
bloc to switch their regional market strategies from export to investment.
1Regionalism and the World Trade System , 1995, p.47.
2World Investment Report (WIR), 1998, p.126.
3Panagariya (2000, p.329) remarks, ￿Equally, in the policy debate, direct foreign in-
vestment is frequently cited as a key reason for signing FTAs and Customs Unions. Yet,
there is little theoretical work drawing the link between these two phenomena. Issues
such as why a regional arrangement might be a better instrument of bringing foreign
direct investment than multilateral liberalization have yet to be addressed.￿
4The Economist (Feb. 17th 2001, p.104) points out ￿(market) size matters￿ based
on an annual survey by A.T. Kearney, a management-consulting ￿rm. World Investment
Report (1998, p.122) remarks that ￿Increased market size - from national to regional or
global - is in itself an e¢ ciency-inducing determinant because it provides the demand
dimension that gives rise to the possibility of exploiting economies of scale and scope in
production and distribution.￿
5See Panagariya￿ s survey paper (2000).
1Ranjan (2001) examines investment creation and diversion6 using a three-
country general-equilibrium model. However, the above authors do not take
account of endogenous bloc formation. Although there are several writers
who have studied endogenous bloc formation, none of them allows multi-
national production operations (Riezman, 1985; Yi, 1996; Burbidge et al.,
1997; McLaren, 2002). Therefore, this paper is the ￿rst study to examine
the e⁄ect of trading blocs on FDI with endogenous coalition formation.7
There are two parts to the analysis. First, I will build a three-country
general-equilibrium model and, second, I will analyze a coalition formation
game. Firms in the model compete in a monopolistically competitive market
and serve foreign markets either by exporting or by setting up plants abroad.
The latter is the operation of MNCs or FDI8. When a ￿rm decides to become
an MNC, it faces trade-o⁄s: incurring sunk costs for building plants abroad
but saving the tari⁄s and transport costs of exporting. The model discusses
various types of equilibrium that characterize ￿rms in the pre- and post-
Free Trade Agreement (FTA)9 scenario. Further, the model permits explicit
welfare calculations for various equilibria.
The varied welfare allows each country to form a preference ordering
over three trading regimes; (i) the Most-Favored-Nation (MFN) regime in
which each country sets tari⁄s against the others, (ii) bilateralism (i.e., a
trading bloc) in which two countries reach an FTA and (iii) multilateralism
(i.e., the free trade world) in which all reach an FTA. The ordering shapes a
strategic partnership plan for each country in the coalition formation game.
Countries in the game can form a bloc if and only if all of its members are
unanimous on the bloc. However, under the unanimity rule, bilateralism is
always trivially a Nash equilibrium, even when all countries strictly prefer
the free trade regime. Hence, I employ one of its re￿nements, Coalition
Proof Nash Equilibrium (CPNE), originally suggested by Berheim et al.
(1987). Thus, the game is a simple application of CPNE. The goal of the
game is to discover under what conditions bilateralism can be an equilibrium
coalition structure rather than multilateralism. I will use these conditions
6Investment is created in the sense that the Single Market Program leads individuals
and ￿rms in a member country to invest in their country or their member countries when
they otherwise would not have invested at all. However, investment diversion occurs when
investment of non-member countries in a member country displaces investment in the rest
of world (Re￿ection on Regionalism, 1997, p.14).
7Krueger (1997, p.177) writes, ￿There are, however, a large number of questions that
arise about the impact of FDI on preferential arrangements and vice versa that, to the
author￿ s knowledge, have not been addressed in the literature.
8In this paper, I focus on the horizontal investment component of FDI. Horizontal
investment is aimed at producing goods for and serving the host country or exporting to
neighboring countries in the same region, as opposed to vertical investment which is aimed
at usually outsourcing production activities to the host country and exporting products
back to the source country (Brenton et al., 1999, p.108).
9If two countries sign an FTA, they eliminate tari⁄s between them while preserving
their own tari⁄s against the rest of world.
2in simulations to determine whether or not a trading bloc will form with the
possibility of FDI.
Section 2 introduces a three-country general-equilibrium model to con-
sider the e⁄ects of FTAs on the strategies of the ￿rms of serving foreign
markets. Section 3 endogenizes the decisions of the countries to form an
FTA by analyzing a coalition formation game. Section 4 discusses numerical
results and draws conclusions. Section 5 gives directions for future research.
2 The Three-Country Model
I introduce a symmetric three-country model. The economy has two sectors:
one numeraire sector and one industry producing di⁄erentiated goods. La-
bor is the only factor in the economy.10 I employ a monopolistic-competition
model for production. The structure of the model follows Helpman and
Krugman (1985), Brainard (1993), and Ranjan (2001). I review the basic
model ￿rst. Then, I consider pre-FTA and post-FTA equilibria, respectively.
2.1 The Basic Model
Here I consider a closed economy. The representative consumer in the econ-












for ! = 1;:::;n and ￿ 2 (0;1): ! is an index for variety. Dw is the quantity
consumed of variety !. D0 is the quantity consumed of the numeraire. ￿
measures the consumer￿ s preference for variety:12 The lower ￿, the greater
the love for variety. The budget constraint of the consumer is
X
!
p!D! + D0 = Y
where p! is the price of variety !; and Y is the income of the consumer.
The consumer￿ s maximization problem yields a demand function for va-







D0 = Y ￿ 1
10Since I do not have capital in the model, FDI in my model represents establishing
control rather than capital ￿ ow (Krugman, 1983, p.62).
11Anderson et al. (1997) introduce a similar utility function with two sectors (a di⁄er-
entiated and a numeraire sector).
12￿ ￿
￿￿1
￿ ;￿ > 1 where ￿ is is the degree of substitutability, or the elasticity of substi-
tution, between any two products. In the limit of perfect substitutability, i.e., ￿ ! 1;
￿ ! 1 : there is no love for variety, and products are perfect substitutes.
3where ￿ ￿
￿
1￿￿ and ￿ 2 (0;1):13 Note that the smaller ￿; the greater the
love for variety. Notice that the total expenditure on di⁄erentiated goods is
￿xed to one. Therefore, I make an assumption that Y > 1 in order to have
an interior solution to the maximization problem.
Consider the production side. There are two kinds of sunk costs in the
production of the di⁄erentiated goods: F is the ￿rm-speci￿c sunk cost, and
G is the plant-speci￿c sunk cost. The ￿rm-speci￿c cost is incurred once
when a ￿rm comes into existence. The cost for blueprints and R&D is an
example of F: The plant-speci￿c cost is incurred whenever a plant is built
(Markusen and Venables, 1996 and 1998). Also, there is a constant marginal
cost c: A ￿rm￿ s pro￿t function producing variety ! with one plant is
￿! = (p! ￿ c!)D! ￿ (F + G):
From the ￿rm￿ s maximization problem, I can get the symmetric equilib-
rium price, which is the same for all varieties:
p = p! =
c
￿
for ! = 1;:::;n:
Given the equilibrium price, output per ￿rm is also the same for all varieties:








for ! = 1;:::;n:
Finally, the zero-pro￿t condition from free entry and exit in the economy





2.2 The Pre-FTA Scenario
Consider an open economy prior to any Free Trade Agreement (FTA). There
are three identical countries in terms of technology, tastes, and labor endow-
ments: Country 1, Country 2, and Country 3. Firms in the di⁄erentiated
sector can penetrate foreign markets either by exporting or by setting up
plants and supplying the goods in the local markets. Thus, there are two
possible types of ￿rms: exporting or national ￿rms with a single plant and
13One assumption made for the derivation of the demand function is that, when there
are many ￿rms in the di⁄erentiated sector, the elasticity of the demand of variety ! can









; ! = 1;:::;n:
14In equilibrium, each variety is produced by only one ￿rm. Thus, the number of ￿rms
equals the number of varieties.
4Multinational Corporations (MNCs) with multiple plants.15 In the pre-FTA
I show the existence of three possible equilibria. In the single-plant equilib-
rium, only national ￿rms exist, in the multiple-plant equilibrium only MNCs
exist, and in the mixed equilibrium both types of ￿rms coexist. However, the
mixed equilibrium is possible only under ￿knife-edge￿conditions so that the
economy tips from the single-plant equilibrium to the multiple-pant equilib-
rium by crossing a border line and vice versa.
2.2.1 The Single-Plant Equilibrium
In this subsection I consider the economy where only national ￿rms exist.
I assume exogenous and uniform ￿iceberg￿transport costs and ad valorem
tari⁄s for the di⁄erentiated products across countries throughout the pa-
per. Here, the tari⁄s are exogenous and uniform partly for simplicity and
partly to re￿ ect rules of the GATT (now the WTO) pertaining to the Most-
Favored-Nation (MFN) principle and preferential trade agreements (Stein
and Frankel, 1994).16
The transport costs and tari⁄s causes consumer prices for imported
goods to exceed producer￿ s prices. For example, consumer￿ s price in Country
1 for imported goods from Country 2 is
p21 =
p2 (1 + ￿)
1 ￿ g
where g is the iceberg transport cost17, 0 ￿ g < 1, ￿ is the tari⁄18, 0 ￿ ￿;
and p2 is a producer￿ s price in Country 2.19 However, I assume that there
are no trading costs for the numeraire and that countries always produce it.
This makes the producers￿prices of the di⁄erentiated goods the same across
countries.
Because of the symmetry of the three countries, it is su¢ cient to consider
just Country 1. A representative consumer in Country 1 maximizes her
15There exist other choices of how ￿rms serve foreign markets. Firms could lisence their
products to foreign ￿rms or could merge or acquire foreign ￿rms. However, for simplicity,
I do not consider these other ways of serving foreign markets.
16In short, Article I of the GATT describes the MFN rule such that signatory gov-
ernments should treat their trading partners equally and uniformly. On the other hand,
Article XXIV of the GATT requires that members of a trade agreement do not raise tari⁄s
against non-members post the agreement (WTO, 1995).
17If 1 unit of good is sent to a foreign country, 1 ￿ g units arrive where 0 ￿ g < 1, so g
units are lost in transit.
18It is assumed that the tari⁄ is levied on the c.i.f. price.
19When g = 0:1 and ￿ = 0:1, the home consumer￿ s price for foreign goods is 22 percent
higher than the home producer￿ s price. When g = 0:1 and ￿ = 0:3, the home consumer￿ s
price for foreign goods is 44 percent higher.






























p31D31 + D0 = Y + TR1 (4)
where i is an index for the three countries. Dij is the quantity consumed by
the consumer in Country j of goods produced in Country i; for i;j = 1;2;3:
pij =
pi(1+￿)
1￿g for i 6= j; and pi is a producer￿ s price in Country i. ni represents
the number of ￿rms in Country i: TR1 is a tari⁄revenue in Country 1 which
is redistributed to the consumer in lump-sum fashion.
The maximization problem yields the equilibrium consumptions of the











































n1 + n2￿ + n3￿
; and






; and 0 < ￿ ￿ 1. Note that the lower the ￿ the higher
the overall trading costs.
Consider a producer￿ s problem in Country 1. Its operating pro￿t20 is
o￿1 = (p1 ￿ c)D11 + (p1 ￿ c)
D12
1 ￿ g
+ (p1 ￿ c)
D13
1 ￿ g
where D11 is given in equation (5), and D12 and D13 can be similarly derived.
After substituting the equilibrium consumptions and p = c=￿ and using the
symmetry in the number of ￿rms21, I have





20The expression of the operating pro￿t is the net of tari⁄s.
21Due to the symmetry of the model, n1 = n2 = n3 ￿ n:







1+￿￿.22 Note that 0 < ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ 1, and
thus
1+2￿
1+2￿ ￿ 1: The operating pro￿t here is smaller than that in the closed
economy. Indeed, this sounds intuitive because, in this trading economy
with positive tari⁄s, some of the total revenue for a ￿rm in the di⁄erentiated
sector is lost to the tari⁄ revenues of governments.
The zero-pro￿t condition determines the number of varieties or, equiva-







Observe that the number of ￿rms here is less than its counterpart (n￿ =
1￿￿
F+G) in the closed economy. This is because with smaller operating pro￿ts
the economy can accommodate fewer number of ￿rms.
I now ￿nd out under what conditions the single-plant equilibrium is
possible. For this, I examine whether a national ￿rm has an incentive to
change its strategy of serving foreign markets from exporting to setting up
plants in the local markets. An exporting ￿rm in the single-plant equilibrium
does not want to deviate to become an MNC if its total pro￿t when exporting
is no less than the total pro￿t when setting up plants overseas. That is, an
exporting ￿rm would not defect to become an MNC if ￿i = ￿0
i for i = 1;2;3;
where ￿i is the total pro￿t of the exporting ￿rm in Country i; and ￿0
i is
the total pro￿t of an MNC headquartered in Country i.23 I call this a
no-defection condition.




where o￿12 is the variable pro￿t earned in Country 2 by the exporting ￿rm
based in Country 1, and o￿0
12 is the variable pro￿t from Country 2 for the
MNC headquartered in Country 1:
o￿12 =
￿





n1￿ + n2 + n3￿
:









for i 6= j; which is the exact same term as ￿. The relative demand is
￿total￿in the sense that it takes account of the ￿indirect￿demand of the foreign goods
lost in transit as well as the direct demand. In fact, ￿ in my paper resembles Krugman￿ s
￿￿￿(1980, p.953).
23Because of the symmetry of countries, when a ￿rm chooses to become an MNC, it
builds two more plants in two foreign markets (one in each market) in addition to the
plant in its domestic market.
7After replacing the symmetric equilibrium number of ￿rms in equation (6),











. This establishes the parameter space for the
single-plant equilibrium.
2.2.2 The Multiple-Plant Equilibrium
In the multiple-plant equilibrium there exist only MNCs in the economy.
Consider a consumer￿ s problem in Country 1 which is similar to the one
in the single-plant equilibrium, equation (2). One thing to note is that the
consumer price for imported goods is the same as the producer price because
this economy does not involve any trading between countries. The FOCs








where nm is the number of the multinational ￿rms headquartered in each
country.
The operating pro￿t for an MNC headquartered in Country1 is
o￿1 = (1 ￿ ￿)
1
nm:





Hence, the total number of ￿rms operating in Country 1 is 3nm: It is most
likely that there are fewer varieties in the multiple-plant equilibrium than
in the single-plant equilibrium due to the higher plant-speci￿c sunk costs.
As in the single-plant equilibrium, I derive a no-defection condition for












The comparison of the two no-defection conditions, inequality (7) and
inequality (10), implies that the mixed equilibrium is possible only on the
24I assume no-integer problem in the derivation so that one ￿rm￿ s deviation does not
a⁄ect the price index at all.
8knife-edge, i.e., when either inequality (7) or inequality (10) holds equally.
Therefore, the economy tips from one equilibrium to the other equilibrium
by crossing the border line. The relationship among the parameters in in-
equality (10) sounds intuitive. As either tari⁄s (￿), transport costs (g);
￿rm-speci￿c sunk costs (F); or the inverse measure for the love for variety
(￿) increases, the multiple-plant equilibrium is more likely to hold. How-
ever, as plant-speci￿c sunk costs (G) increases, the single-plant equilibrium
is more likely to hold.
Finally, I can calculate the welfare in each equilibrium given with the
equilibrium consumption, equations (5) and (8), and the equilibrium num-
bers of ￿rms, equations (6) and (9). Notice that the welfare of a country in
both equilibria is the same for the other countries due to the symmetry of
the three countries.
2.3 The Post-FTA Scenario
Now suppose that Country 1 and 2 sign an FTA so that they abolish tari⁄s
on imports from each other. Hence, trading between the member countries
incurs only a transport cost. There are ￿ve possible equilibria in the post-
FTA scenario: single-plant, hybrid, concentrating, and two kinds of multiple-
plant (two-plant and three-plant) equilibrium.
In the post-FTA single-plant equilibrium, all ￿rms are exporters. Note
that ￿rms in Country 3 cannot cross the border between the member coun-
tries without paying tari⁄s. This is basically the idea of the Rule of Origin
(ROO). Only the products that are made within the member countries are
subject to zero tari⁄s. Therefore, the ROO prevents the ￿rms outside from
exporting all of their products into one member country and then exporting
to the other member country without paying tari⁄s.
The hybrid equilibrium is the case in which the ￿rms inside are exporters,
but the ￿rms outside are MNCs. However, these MNCs have two plants in
total, not three. They build only one plant in one of the member countries
and then export their ￿nal goods to the other member country without
incurring any tari⁄s. This operation does not violate the ROO.
In the two-plant equilibrium, ￿rms in Country 1 and 2 set up their foreign
subsidiaries in Country 3 but not in each other￿ s market. Firms in Country
3 build their plants in Country 1 to serve the local market and export their
products from the plant in Country 1 to Country 2. Furthermore, as in the
pre-FTA, it is still possible that when trade barriers are very high, MNCs
have three plants with one plant in each country. I call this situation the
three-plant equilibrium. It is even feasible that all ￿rms could operate in the
integrated region (Country 1 and 2) so that no production of di⁄erentiated
products is present in Country 3. This is called the concentrating equilib-
rium. This can happen for a relatively lower level of the trading costs. The
￿rms in the equilibrium realize the increasing returns to scale by concen-
9trating their productions at the larger and integrated market and exporting
their products to Country 3 with the low trading costs. However, since the
two multiple-plant and the concentrating equilibria are not directly relevant
to the main theme of the paper, I will omit discussion of them.25
2.3.1 The Single-Plant Equilibrium
In this equilibrium, all ￿rms are exporters.26 Recalling that there are no
tari⁄s between Country 1 and 2, a ￿rm￿ s operating pro￿t in Country 1 is
o￿s

































0 < ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ 1.
The operating pro￿t for a ￿rm in Country 2 is parallel to that in Country
1 due to the symmetry of the member countries. However, a ￿rm in Country
3 incurs not only the transport cost but also the tari⁄s when it exports to
the free trade area. Hence, its operating pro￿t is
o￿s





















The three zero-pro￿t conditions determine the number of ￿rms in each
country: o￿i = F + G; i = 1;2;3. After a tedious derivation, I obtain the






1 + ￿ ￿ 2￿2
1 + ￿ ￿ 2￿2
(1 + ￿ ￿ 2￿) ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)






1 + ￿ ￿ 2￿2
1 + ￿ ￿ 2￿2
(1 ￿ ￿)(1 + ￿) ￿ 2￿ (1 + ￿ ￿ 2￿)
(1 + ￿ ￿ 2￿)(1 ￿ ￿)
:
In order to ensure a positive number of ￿rms operating in each country, I
restrict the trading costs as follows:
￿ (1 ￿ ￿) < (1 + ￿ ￿ 2￿) <
(1 ￿ ￿)(1 + ￿)
2￿
: (12)
Although the comparison between ns
1 and ns
3 is analytically ambiguous,
simulations suggest that ns
1 > ns
3: It is also ambiguous whether the total
number of ￿rms in this equilibrium is bigger than the total number in the
pre-FTA equilibrium and whether the integrated region gains more ￿rms
25Discussion on the two multiple-plant and the concentrating equilibria are available
upon request.
26When I analyze the post-FTA equilibria, I treat each block member separately rather
than as one entity because of non-zero transport costs.
10after integration. However, simulations show that the total number of ￿rms
increases after the FTA, and there exist more ￿rms in the integrated region
but fewer ￿rms outside.27 Thus, the simulation results suggest that the
integrated market can facilitate more ￿rms than each individual market can
in total.
Intuitive explanation on the simulation results is as follows: Formation
of a bloc expands a market size not only for existing ￿rms but also for
potential ￿rms in the bloc. The expanded market promotes the potential
￿rms to enter the bloc market, because the market size is now big enough for
them to recoup the ￿rm-speci￿c sunk costs. Furthermore, the new entrants
replace ￿rms outside the bloc as ￿rms outside are not so competitive as ￿rms
inside due to the non-zero external tari⁄s. Hence, the number of ￿rms in
the non-member country drops to a small number after integration.
Examination of no-defection conditions additionally restricts the para-
meter space for the post-FTA single-plant equilibrium. An exporting ￿rm
may contemplate to switch to setting up multiple plants as its mode of serv-
ing foreign markets. If the ￿rm switches, it could choose either two plants
(one in the integrated region and the other in the non-member country)
or three plants (one plant in each country). However, since building more
plants incurs more plant-speci￿c sunk costs, it is easier for an exporting ￿rm
to switch to setting up two plants than to setting up three plants. This im-
plies that if an exporting ￿rm does not deviate to become a two-plant MNC,
defecting to become a three-plant MNC is out of the question.28 Therefore,
I only need to examine the former, which is that an exporting ￿rm in any
country would not defect to become an MNC with two plants unless prof-
itable. This condition is summarized by
￿(3 + ￿ ￿ 4￿)G ￿ (1 + ￿ ￿ 2￿)(1 ￿ ￿)F for 2￿2 < 1 + ￿: (13)
Overall, the parameter restrictions from positive numbers of ￿rms (in-
equality (12)) and from the above no-defection condition (inequality (13))
determine the parameter space for the post-FTA single-plant equilibrium.
2.3.2 The Hybrid Equilibrium
I move on to examine another equilibrium in which ￿the ￿rms outside a
bloc￿are MNCs, but the ￿rms inside are exporters. The MNCs have two
plants: one in Country 3 and the other in either bloc member countries.29
27Refer to Columns 3, 4, and 6 in Table 1 for the simulation results.
28I explicitly consider the no-defection condition to a three-plant MNC and con￿rm that
it is not binding whenever the no-defection to a two-plant MNC holds.
29It is true that the MNCs here are not domiciled, because where they incur the ￿rm-
speci￿c sunk costs does not matter in the model. However, I assume that they are all
headquartered in a non-member country so that I can treat setting up plants in member
countries as inward FDI from a non-member. This assumption, however, does not a⁄ect
welfare results and thus main conclusions of the paper.
11In addition, it must be true that, in equilibrium, a 50 percent of the MNCs
have their foreign subsidiaries in one member country, and another 50 per-
cent of the MNCs have their foreign subsidiaries in the other member. I
name this equilibrium the hybrid. Such an equilibrium can be also found
in an oligopolistic model. Motta and Norman (1996) point out in a three-
country and three-￿rm model that the improved market accessibility due to
a regional bloc can induce an outside ￿rm to switch its strategy of serving
the regional market from exporting to investing. I show a similar result in
this general-equilibrium setting.
I derive the operating pro￿t for an exporting ￿rm in Country 1 as follows:
o￿h



































pro￿t for a ￿rm in Country 2 is analogous to that in Country 1 because of
the symmetry of the member countries.
Firms in Country 3 are MNCs with two plants. Now suppose that a ￿rm
has one plant in Country 3, builds a plant in Country 1 to serve the local
market, and export its goods from the subsidiary in Country 1 to Country 2.
However, it still incurs the transport costs in exporting to Country 2. Over-
all, compared to the case for a national ￿rm, the MNC saves the transport
costs and tari⁄s in ￿trading￿to Country 1 and avoids tari⁄s in exporting
to Country 2, whereas the MNC spends a plant-speci￿c sunk cost in setting
up a plant in Country 1. Having noted this, the operating pro￿t for a ￿rm
in Country 3 is given by
o￿h























Again, the three zero-pro￿t conditions determine the number of ￿rms in
each country. They are o￿h
i = F + G; i = 1;2; but o￿h
3 = F + 2G. The























(1 ￿ ￿)F + (1 ￿ 2￿)G
￿
:
Although it is analytically hard to determine the relationship among the
numbers of ￿rms, simulation sheds some lights on the relationship.30 The
total number of ￿rms in the hybrid equilibrium turns out to be less than that
30See columns 5 and 7 in Table 1 which correspond to the hybrid equilibrium.
12in the pre-FTA equilibrium. In particular, the number of ￿rms in Country
1 (2) sharply drops while the numbers in Country 3 increase compared to
the numbers in the pre-FTA single-plant equilibrium. I can deduce a similar
result from the oligopolistic model in Motta and Norman (1996). They
argue that when a reduction of intra-regional tari⁄ induces a ￿rm outside
to switch from exporting to investing, both prices and the ￿rms￿pro￿ts in
the regional market fall. However, the indigenous ￿rm in the host country
for FDI experiences a greater falling pro￿t. In my monopolistic competition
setting, a greater falling pro￿t can be interpreted as a sharp drop in the
number of active ￿rms in the host countries, which is exactly the case in the
simulation.
I impose some restrictions on the parameters in order to warrant the
positive number of ￿rms in each country. The restrictions are listed in the
order for nh
1;nh
2 > 0; and nh
3 > 0:
1




and [2(￿ + ￿) ￿ 1]G ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)F: (14)
These restrictions constrain the parameter space for the hybrid equilibrium
combined with the following no-defection conditions. One condition states
that no ￿rm in Country 3 deviates to become an exporter unless it is prof-
itable, which is given by
[￿(3 + ￿ ￿ 4￿)]G ￿ (1 + ￿ ￿ 2￿)(1 ￿ ￿)F: (15)
Another no-defection condition is that no ￿rm in Country 1 defects to





1 is the operating pro￿t of the exporting ￿rm Country 1, and o￿h0
1
is the pro￿t when the ￿rm defects to become an MNC with two plants.
However, the right hand side of the above condition is simply equal to G;
which means this inequality weakly holds. That is, the ￿rm in Country 1
is indi⁄erent between being an exporter and being an MNC. The intuition
about indi⁄erence is that, in the perspective of the ￿rms in the integrated
region, Country 3 is a smaller but less crowded market. The smaller market
suggests that ￿rms export, whereas the less crowded market encourages
them to set up plants.
The ￿nal no-defection condition is that no ￿rm in both the integrated
region and the non-member country deviates to become an MNC with three
plants, which is given by
(￿ + 2￿ ￿ 3￿￿)G = (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿)F: (16)
Overall, the parameter space for the hybrid equilibrium comes from the
combination of three restrictions: the parameter restriction from positive
13numbers of ￿rms (inequality (14)), and the two no-defection conditions (in-
equalities (15) and (16)).
As in the pre-FTA scenario, I can calculate the welfare in the post-FTA
scenario. Various welfare in the pre- and post-FTA scenario become the
payo⁄s of the three countries under di⁄erent trading regimes in the coalition
formation game, which is the next topic.
3 The Coalition Formation Game
This section endogenizes a country￿ s decision on coalition formation. The
coalition formation game considers the unanimity rule as a coalition-structuring
rule, which reconciles each country￿ s partnership plan into a coalition struc-
ture. According to the unanimity rule, players can form a bloc if and only if
all of its members agree upon the coalition. However, under the unanimity
rule, bilateralism is always trivially a Nash equilibrium, even when all three
countries strictly prefer the free trade regime. This is because a unilateral
deviation results in the dissolution of a coalition. Further, Nash equilibrium
acknowledges only the possibility of a unilaterally pro￿table deviation, but
does not take into account a mutually bene￿cial deviation. Hence, I will use
one of the re￿nements of Nash equilibrium, namely, a Coalition Proof Nash
equilibrium (CPNE) originally suggested by Bernheim, Peleg, and Whinston
(1987). CPNE is a desirable equilibrium concept in the environment where
the players can freely communicate and make non-binding but mutually
bene￿cial agreements. (Bernheim et al., 1987).
In the following subsection, I de￿ne a game structure and CPNE. Then,
I provide su¢ cient and necessary conditions under which bilateralism can be
an equilibrium outcome. These conditions are instrumental to numerically
plot the parameter space for equilibrium coalition structure later.
3.1 De￿nitions
The set of the three countries is given by N = f1;2;3g. Denote B as the set
of all possible coalition structures, b:
B = fff1g;f2g;f3gg;ff1;2g;f3gg;ff1;3g;f2gg;ff2;3g;f1gg;ff1;2;3ggg:
The ￿rst element represents the MFN regime, while the last represents the
grand coalition (i.e., the free trade regime). The remaining three elements
indicate bilateralism (i.e., trading blocs).
The game is simultaneous and non-cooperative. Country i￿ s strategy is
its partnership plan which describes with whom it wants to form a coalition.
Call this Si: Si must be a subset of N with i 2 Si. Then, a strategy pro￿le, s,
puts together the partnerships of the three countries so that s = (S1;S2;S3).
Further, de￿ne the strategy space for Country i as ^ Si and the set of all
strategy pro￿les as ^ S = ￿i2N ^ Si.
14A function   determines a coalition structure for a given pro￿le of part-
nership, that is,   : ^ S ! B. In other words, a function   assigns a coalition
structure b =   (s) to any s 2 ^ S. I call the function   the coalition-structure
rule. There are several candidates for the coalition-structure rule, for exam-
ple, open membership, exclusive membership, and unanimity rule.31 The
open membership rule requires that a player can freely join a coalition as
long as the player is willing to abide by the rules of the coalition. In a sense,
under this rule, the membership is open to outsiders. On the other hand,
under the exclusive membership, a coalition forms only among the players
who announce the same list of players in the coalition.
According to the unanimity rule, players form a bloc if and only if all
of its members are unanimous about the coalition. Otherwise, the play-
ers remain singletons. The unanimity rule is very similar to the exclu-
sive rule because both rules require that players in a coalition have an
identical partnership plan, that is, an identical strategy. However, the
unanimity rule further demands that all players in the partnership plan
join in the coalition. For illustration, suppose a strategy pro￿le such that
s = (f1;2;3g; f1;2;3g; f2;3g). Since Country 1 and 2 announce the
same ￿address￿ , the resulting coalition structure is b = ff1;2g;f3gg un-
der the open membership rule. Similarly, the exclusive membership rule
results in b = ff1;2g;f3gg because both Country 1 and 2 have the iden-
tical partnership plan. However, not all countries in the partnership plan
do participate in the coalition. Thus, the resultant coalition structure is
b = ff1g;f2g;f3gg under the unanimity rule.
It is important to note that what happens to a coalition when a member
of a coalition leaves. The remaining members of the coalition stay together
under both the open and exclusive membership rules, whereas the coali-
tion completely breaks down for the unanimity rule. Hence, for any given
strategy pro￿le, the unanimity rule allows the ￿￿nest￿coalition structure
among the three rules in the sense that the unanimity rule makes it harder
to achieve a coalition between two or more players. Another observation is
that no matter what the coalition-structure rule is, the grand coalition is
possible only when all countries agree upon it. In the following analysis,
however, I concentrate only on the unanimity rule as the coalition-structure
rule in order to avoid any intricacies involved with the other rules.
A payo⁄ to Country i is its welfare under a given coalition structure.
Thus, de￿ne the payo⁄ function to be Wi :   (B) ! R+: Therefore, for
example, given that the strategies of the other countries are S2 and S3, the
payo⁄ to Country 1 with its strategy S1 is W1 (  (S1;S2;S3)) or, equiva-
lently, W1 (  (s)) = W1 (b).32
31Burbidge et al. (1997) call the exclusive membership the similarity rule and call the
unanimity rule the strict unanimity rule.
32Throughout the game, I assume no side-payments for simplicity.
15As mentioned earlier, Nash equilibrium produces too many outcomes
and does not allow a mutually pro￿table deviation. Thus, I adopt a Coali-
tion Proof Nash Equilibrium (CPNE) as an equilibrium concept. Coalition-
proofness is recursively de￿ned. In a heuristic manner, a strategy pro￿le is
called coalition-proof if and only if there is no Pareto-superior coalition de-
viation to the strategy pro￿le which is self-enforceable, taking the strategies
of its complement as ￿xed. The deviation is self-enforceable in the sense
that it is itself free from further deviations by the subsets of the deviating
coalition. Moreover, the self-enforceability requires that when a deviation
occurs, only members of the deviating coalition can deviate further from
the deviation. This implies that non-members￿strategies are taken as given
when the members contemplate a further deviation.33
For clarity, let me go through the recursive steps in the de￿nition of
CPNE, using an example. A coalition is formed according to the unanimity
rule. The steps are as follows: (i) A deviation by a bloc of two countries,
say Country 1 and 2, is self-enforceable if and only if (i⁄ ) neither member
of that bloc would want to change unilaterally or, in other words, i⁄ 34
W1 (ff1;2g;f3gg) ￿ W1 (ff1g;f2g;f3gg) and W1 (ff1;3g;f2gg);
AND (17)
W2 (ff1;2g;f3gg) ￿ W2 (ff1g;f2g;f3gg) and W2 (ff2;3g;f1gg):
(ii) A deviation by a bloc of three countries is self-enforceable i⁄ there is no
self-enforceable bloc of two countries or one country that would be willing
33The reader is invited to see Berheim et al. (1987) for a formal treatment of CPNE.
34Notice that the inequalities do not include Wi (ff1;2;3gg) for i = 1;2 and
W1 (ff2;3g;f1gg) and W2 (ff1;3g;f2gg): When either member of the bloc, f1;2g,
unilaterally deviates, it is impossible to reach the grand coalition under the unanim-
ity rule. Thus, neither Country 1 nor Country 2 takes Wi (f1;2;3g) into consider-
ation. Next, consider that one of the two countries in f1;2g unilaterally deviates.
When Country 1, say, deviates, f1;2g breaks down. Depending on Country 3￿ s strat-
egy, the resultant coalition structure is either ff1g;f2g;f3gg or ff1;3g;f2gg; but not
ff2;3g;f1gg; she cannot force the others to form their own coalition. However, it is pos-
sible to arrive ff2;3g;f1gg if Country 2 would want to deviate from f1;2g, that is, if
W2 (ff2;3g;f1gg) ￿ W2 (ff1;2g;f3gg). Here, the country that deviates and compares
the welfare is Country 2, not Country 1. This is why I do not include W1 (ff2;3g;f1gg) in
the welfare comparison for Country 1 but include it in the welfare comparison for Country
2. A similar argument applies when Country 2 unilaterally deviates.
16to deviate or, in other words, i⁄
W1 (ff1;2;3gg) ￿ W1 (ff1g;f2g;f3gg);W1 (ff1;2g;f3gg);
and W1 (ff1;3g;f2gg);
OR (18)
W1 (ff1;2;3gg) ￿ W1 (ff1;2g;f3gg);
but the bilateral deviation, f1;2g, is not self-enforceable,
OR
W1 (ff1;2;3gg) ￿ W1 (ff1;3g;f2gg);
but the bilateral deviation, f1;3g, is not self-enforceable,
AND similarly for Country 2.
(iii) A strategy pro￿le is a CPNE i⁄ there is no further self-enforceable bloc
of any size that would want to deviate from the strategy pro￿le.
I adopt a CPNE as an equilibrium concept. Then, for a CPNE strat-
egy pro￿le s￿; a coalition structure b￿ is an equilibrium outcome under the
unanimity rule, that is, b￿ =   (s￿).
3.2 Equilibrium Coalition Structure
Given the elements of the game laid out, I am now ready to derive conditions
where bilateralism rather than multilateralism is the equilibrium outcome.
The conditions involve comparisons of welfare under di⁄erent coalition struc-
tures (i.e., trading regimes). However, the welfare depends on the parameter
values in the model. Therefore, whether the conditions hold, rendering bilat-
eralism an equilibrium coalition structure, really depends on the parameters.
Once I know the conditions, I can determine numerically under what pa-
rameter values bilateralism can be an equilibrium outcome. Proposition 1
states the conditions.
Proposition 1 b￿ = ff1;2g;f3gg is an equilibrium coalition structure
under the unanimity rule i⁄
W1 (ff1;2g;f3gg) ￿ W1 (ff1g;f2g;f3gg); W1 (ff1;3g;f2gg); and
W1 (ff1;2;3gg); AND
W2 (ff1;2g;f3gg) ￿ W2 (ff1g;f2g;f3gg); W2 (ff2;3g;f1gg); and
W2 (ff1;2;3gg): (19)
The proof is omitted to conserve a space and is available upon request.
Let me sketch here what the proof involves. First, for the ￿if￿statement,
I show that if inequalities (19) hold, f1;2g is a self-enforceable bilateral
deviation, and there is no further self-enforceable bloc deviation of any size
from it. Thus, f1;2g constitutes a CPNE. Next, for the ￿only if￿direction,
I prove that the necessary and su¢ cient conditions for f1;2g to be a CPNE
17are the exact same inequalities as inequalities (19). One remark is that if a
bloc formed from any country pair is a CPNE outcome, then the bloc formed
by any other pair is as well. That is, b￿ = ff1;2g;f3gg; ff1;3g;f2gg; or
ff2;3g;f1gg: In the following section, inequalities (19) are instrumental to
numerically plot the parameter space for equilibrium coalition structure.
4 Bilateralism vs. Multilateralism
In this section, I present numerical results, discuss their implications, and
draw conclusions. In simulations, I ￿x the degree of love for variety (￿ = 0:75),
the two sunk costs (F = G = 10), while varying the transport costs (g), and
tari⁄s (￿). Figure 1 shows the parameter space for various equilibria in the
pre- and post-FTA scenario. The ￿gure is in the two dimensions of g and
￿. There exist four distinct regions depending on the parameters. Finally,
I use the welfare comparison, inequalities (19), in Proposition 1 to ￿nd out
the parameter region for equilibrium coalition structure. That is, Figure 2
presents a region for bilateralism and a region for multilateralism.
Comparing Figure 1 and 2 reveals that the parameter region for bi-
lateralism is a subset of the parameter space of the single-plant and the
concentrating equilibrium in the post-FTA.35 Hence, bilateralism is possible
for some parameter values where only exporting ￿rms exist in the pre and
post-FTA. Therefore, we can conclude that bilateralism, instead of multi-
lateralism, can be an equilibrium outcome with the possibility of FDI, but
that it does not coincide with FDI. Some authors have found a similar re-
sult, while they do not allow FDI into their analyses.36 However, what is
new here is that the result has been arrived at through a general-equilibrium
model with monopolistic competition.
Let me expound the intuition for the result. The welfare of a country in
a bloc can be superior to that in the MFN regime and, importantly, superior
to that under multilateralism. Signing an FTA is a so-called ￿beggar-thy-
neighbor￿ policy. Countries forming a bloc can extract tari⁄ rents from
non-members, which should make the members better-o⁄ but worsen the
non-members. Furthermore, there is a variety e⁄ect. Elimination of tari⁄s
between the members creates a larger and integrated market. The extended
market, then, can facilitate more ￿rms than each individual market can in
total under multilateralism. More ￿rms mean more varieties, which should
improve the welfare of the bloc members. On the other hand, the ￿rms
outside are less competitive in the bloc market due to non-zero external
tari⁄s, and thus su⁄er losses. Then, under the assumption of free entry and
35Observe that the combined trading costs of the parameter space for bilateralism are
relatively small.
36Bond and Syropoulos (1996) demonstrate a similar result in a pure exchange model,
and Yi (1996) in a partial-equilibrium model of oligopoly.
18exit, fewer ￿rms remain, which should worsen the non-member￿ s welfare.
In a nutshell, when countries form a bloc, they can be much better-o⁄ at
the expense of the non-members so that their welfare can be even higher
than the welfare under multilateralism, that is, forming a bloc can be the
beggar-thy-neighbor policy.37
Remarkably, however, Figure 2 shows that bilateralism cannot be an
equilibrium outcome for the parameter space of the hybrid equilibrium. In-
stead, multilateralism (i.e., the grand coalition) is the equilibrium outcome.
In other words, when countries are in the environment where the forma-
tion of a bloc could cause FDI from the non-members, multilateralism is
the equilibrium outcome. This result implies that the formation of an FDI-
attracting bloc is not an equilibrium outcome when multilateral free trade
is an option for the countries.
When a trading bloc causes ￿rms outside to become MNCs, member
countries in the bloc can be better o⁄ than in the MFN regime; the overall
price level in bloc members is lower than in the MFN regime and the free
trade regime, because the MNCs from a non-member do not pay tari⁄s
and transport costs. However, this welfare improvement is not enough to
compensate for the adverse welfare e⁄ects of the tari⁄-jumping FDI.
Since the ￿rms outside jump over the tari⁄ barrier, there is no chance
that the member countries will extract tari⁄ rents from the non-member
country in the hybrid equilibrium. Furthermore, there is economic ine¢ -
ciency associated with FDI. When countries form a bloc, there is too much
tendency for ￿rms outside the bloc to jump over the trade barriers, tari⁄s
and transport costs, and to invest into the bloc markets. Although set-
ting up plants is the best strategy for ￿rms outside in response to the bloc
formation, it is not necessarily optimal from the point of views of member
countries. Hence, setting up plants results in the waste of resources, which
otherwise could be used for producing more varieties. In the model, the rela-
tively small number of varieties available in the world economy give evidence
of this waste of resources and ine¢ ciency.
Overall, the FDI can improve the welfare of members due to the lower
prices, but the welfare improvement is not su¢ cient to compensate for the
adverse welfare e⁄ects resulting from the elimination of tari⁄-rent extraction
and the ine¢ ciency with the FDI. Thus, the welfare of a member country
with FDI cannot exceed the welfare under multilateral free trade. Therefore,
when a trading bloc can cause FDI from a non-member country, countries
choose multilateralism rather than bilateralism.
37A similar argument can be also found in Yi (1996) at the context of a Customs Union.
195 Concluding Remarks
To summarize the main points, I show that, with the possibility of FDI,
countries may choose bilateralism instead of multilateralism, but it does not
coincide with FDI. Further, when the bloc can cause FDI from the non-
member countries, countries will choose multilateralism to avoid the FDI.
Some directions for future research are worth mentioning. The literature
of economic growth often ￿nds that both capital accumulation from FDI,
as well as any technology spillover e⁄ects of FDI, lead to economic growth
in host countries (Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1999; Borensztein et al., 1998).
Hence, if I introduce these elements of FDI into the model so that they
can improve considerably the welfare of host countries, bilateralism might
reappear in equilibrium.
In reality there is more than one reason why countries form trading
blocs. Suppose that bloc-seeking countries have both a political motive as
well as an economic motive to attract FDI. We know from the discussion in
this paper that the tari⁄-jumping FDI would not improve signi￿cantly the
welfare of member countries. However, if the political reason dominates the
welfare e⁄ect of FDI, the countries would want to form a bloc. Incorporating
other motives of blocs would enrich the current analysis, though at the price
of complication in modelling them.
Other worthwhile direction could be to endogenize tari⁄s in the model.
In fact, endogenous tari⁄s seem appropriate in this situation where a gov-
ernment chooses a trade policy on its own. One way to endogenize the tari⁄
is to use a tari⁄ which maximizes a country￿ s welfare given the tari⁄s of
other countries, which is an optimal tari⁄. However, endogenizing tari⁄s
might make this model intractable.
Finally, one might want to avoid the knife-edge condition so that the
model could generate a mixed equilibrium where both national and multi-
national ￿rms coexist. The knife-edge condition is primarily due to the
symmetry of the model. In order to avoid the knife-edge condition, asym-
metric factors could be used in the model. A quick ￿x would be to assume
that each ￿rm, which is specialized at a particular variety, has a di⁄erent
plant sunk cost. This would generate a mixed equilibrium such that export-
ing ￿rms, which have a higher plant sunk cost, and MNCs, which have a
lower cost, coexist.
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Table 1: Simulations 
 
Parameters         
g : transport cost  0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.24 0.24
τ: tariff  0.3 0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.05 0.15
Type of Equilibrium in Pre, Post-FTA  (S,S) (S,S) (S,S) (S,S) (S,H) (S,S)  (S,H)
Consumptions per variety  
Pre-FTA equilibrium   
home cons'n of home gds  35.2888 24.4101 30.0626 35.2294 39.7223 34.8373  39.9475
home cons'n of foreign gds  12.3556 16.0155 13.4718 11.1468 9.125 9.5618  7.62
Free Trade   
home cons'n of home gds  20 24.4101 24.4101 24.4101 24.4101 31.9497  31.9497
home cons'n of foreign gds  20 16.0155 16.0155 16.0155 16.0155 10.6591  10.6591
Post-FTA equilibrium   
a member's cons'n of own gds  22.2201 24.4101 24.4291 26.2559 28.7556 32.5358  34.7103
a member's cons'n of partner's gds  22.2201 16.0155 16.028 17.2265 18.8665 10.8547  11.5801
member 1's cons'n of outsider gds   7.7799 16.0155 10.9473 8.3075 28.7556 8.9302  34.7103
member 2's cons'n of outsider gds   7.7799 16.0155 10.9473 8.3075 28.7556 8.9302  34.7103
outsider's cons'n of a member's gds  15.5598 16.0155 15.9858 13.1431 9.2534 10.0181  7.64
outsider's cons'n of own gds  44.4402 24.4101 35.6726 41.5388 40.2816 36.4996  40.0527
The Number of Firms  
Pre-FTA  0.0111 0.0125 0.0119 0.0115 0.0113 0.0122 0.0119
Free Trade  0.0125 0.0125 0.0125 0.0125 0.0125 0.0125 0.0125
Post-FTA   
member 1  0.0164 0.0125 0.017 0.0153 0.0086 0.0133  0.0079
member 2  0.0164 0.0125 0.017 0.0153 0.0086 0.0133  0.0079
non-member 0.0019 0.0125 0.0024 0.0052 0.0129 0.0105  0.0141
total number of firms  0.0347 0.0375 0.0364 0.0358 0.0301 0.0371  0.0299
Welfare  
Pre-FTA equilibrium  997.5385 997.5514 997.5295 997.5054 997.4812 997.4534 997.435
Free Trade  997.6178 997.5514 997.5514 997.5514 997.5514 997.4617 997.4617
Post-FTA equilibrium   
member's welfare  997.5887 997.5514 997.5551 997.5399 997.4968 997.4639  997.4341
non-member's welfare  997.5564 997.5514 997.5055 997.493 997.4556 997.4406  997.4183
Tariff Revenues  
Pre-FTA equilibrium  0.11 0 0.0475 0.0763 0.0921 0.0205 0.0477
Post-FTA equilibrium   
Tariff revenues of a member   0.0059 0 0.0039 0.0128 0 0.0082  0
Tariff revenues of non-member  0.2047 0 0.0805 0.1188 0.0711 0.0233  0.032
 
Notes: Other parameters are set as follows for the simulations: Y=1000, c=1, ρ=0.75, and F=G=10. In the 
simulations, I consider only the single-plant equilibrium for the pre-FTA scenario and either the single-
plant or the hybrid equilibrium for the post-FTA. As in the text, I assume that the countries signing an 
FTA are Country 1 (member 1) and Country 2 (member 2), and thus Country 3 is the outsider. (S, S) 
represents the single-plant equilibrium for both periods. (S, H) is the single-plant equilibrium in the pre-
FTA and the hybrid in the post-FTA.  
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Figure 1: The Parameter Space for Various Equilibria 





























Notes: Other parameters are set as follows for the simulations: Y=1000, c=1, ρ=0.75, and F=G=10. 
In this figure, I plot the parameter space for the various equilibria in the pre- and post-FTA 
scenario. The first item in parentheses indicates the pre-FTA equilibrium, and the second the 
post-FTA equilibrium. (Single, Single) represents the single-plant equilibrium for both periods. 
(Single, Concent.) is the single-plant equilibrium and the concentrating equilibrium. (S, H) is the 
single-plant and the hybrid equilibrium. (Multiple, Hybrid) is the multiple-plant (with three 
plants) and the hybrid equilibrium.  
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Figure 2: The Parameter Space for Equilibrium Coalition Structure 
otes: For the parameter values, refer to the notes in Figure 1. Bilateralism represents an FTA  tes in Figure 1. Bilateralism represents an FTA 





























between two countries, while multilateralism is multilateral free trade among all three countries. 
It is important to note that the parameter region for bilateralism is a subset of the parameter space 
of (Single, Single) and (Single, Concent.) in Figure 1. Thus, bilateralism is possible for some 
parameter values where only exporting firms exist in the pre- and post-FTA. On the other hand, 
notice that bilateralism is not an equilibrium outcome for the parameter space of the hybrid 
equilibrium. This means that under the parameter space where the formation of a bloc can cause 
firms outside the bloc to become MNCs, bilateralism cannot be an equilibrium outcome. Instead, 
multilateralism is the equilibrium outcome. 
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